

High-speed high-security signatures

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Joint work with Daniel J. Bernstein, Niels Duif,
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Ed25519 speed

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- ▶ Fast key-pair generation: Almost as fast as signing
- ▶ Signatures have only 64 bytes (no hidden slowdowns)
- ▶ Public keys have only 32 bytes (no hidden slowdowns)

- ▶ No secret array indices, no information flow from secret data to addresses \Rightarrow no cache-timing attacks
- ▶ No secret branch conditions, no information flow from secret data to branch unit
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CONDITIONALLY
ACCEPTED

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ACCEPTED

- ▶ Software uses NaCl/SUPERCOP API
- ▶ Included in SUPERCOP <http://bench.cr.yp.to/supercop.html>
- ▶ Will also be in NaCl <http://nacl.cr.yp.to/>
- ▶ Public domain – use it any way you want!

<http://ed25519.cr.yp.to>