

Point Counting for Genus 2 Curves with Real Multiplication

Pierrick Gaudry, David Kohel, Benjamin Smith

Benjamin Smith
INRIA Saclay-Île-de-France
Laboratoire d'Informatique de l'École polytechnique (LIX)

ECC 2011, Nancy, France 21/09/2011

Genus 2, faster

Gaudry, Kohel,
Smith

Genus 1 and 2

Point counting

Division polys

Kernels

Schoof complexity

BSGS

Real multiplication

Split primes

Smaller kernels

New relations

RM Complexity

$1 = 2$

RM families

Implementation

Cryptographic
Jacobians

Too much, too fast

Genus 2 cryptosystems have security and efficiency comparable* with elliptic curve cryptosystems...

...but setting up secure genus 2 instances is much harder.

Computing cardinalities over prime fields:

- ▶ 256-bit elliptic curve: SEA in seconds
- ▶ 256-bit abelian surface: replace seconds with days.

Given $C : y^2 = f(x)$ of genus 2 over \mathbb{F}_q
(q odd, J_C ordinary, absolutely irreducible).

We want to compute $\#J_C(\mathbb{F}_q)$. *Equivalently:*
Compute the characteristic polynomial of Frobenius

$$\chi(T) = T^4 - s_1 T^3 + (s_2 + 2q) T^2 - qs_1 T + q^2,$$

which is subject to the Weil bounds

$$|s_1| \leq 4\sqrt{q} \quad \text{and} \quad |s_2| \leq 4q$$

and the Rück bounds

$$s_1^2 - 4s_2 \geq 0 \quad \text{and} \quad s_2 + 4q \geq 2|s_1|.$$

Genus 2, faster

Gaudry, Kohel,
Smith

Genus 1 and 2

Point counting

Division polys

Kernels

Schoof complexity

BSGS

Real multiplication

Split primes

Smaller kernels

New relations

RM Complexity

1 = 2

RM families

Implementation

Cryptographic
Jacobians

Too much, too fast

Schoof's idea:

characteristic polynomial of Frobenius acting on $J_C[\ell]$ is

$$\chi_\ell(T) := \chi(T) \pmod{\ell}, \quad \text{so}$$

$$(\pi^2 + [\bar{q}])^2(D) - [\bar{s}_1](\pi^2 + [\bar{q}])\pi(D) + [\bar{s}_2]\pi^2(D) = 0$$

for all D in $J_C[\ell]$ (here $\bar{\cdot}$ denotes residue mod ℓ).

- ▶ Compute χ_ℓ for sufficiently many prime (powers) ℓ
- ▶ Recover χ via the CRT.

To compute χ_ℓ :

1. compute generic D in $J_C[\ell]$;
2. compute $\pi^2(D)$, $(\pi^2 + [\bar{q}])\pi(D)$, and $(\pi^2 + [\bar{q}])^2(D)$;
3. search for $[\bar{s}_1]$ and $[\bar{s}_2]$ s.t. the relation holds.

Let (u, v) be a generic point of C , and D its image in J_C .

We say $\phi \in \text{End}(J_C)$ is *explicit* if we can compute polynomials $d_0, d_1, d_2, e_0, e_1, e_2$ such that

$$\phi(D) = \left(x^2 + \frac{d_1(u)}{d_2(u)}x + \frac{d_0(u)}{d_2(u)}, y - v \left(\frac{e_1(u)}{e_2(u)}x + \frac{e_0(u)}{e_2(u)} \right) \right).$$

We call the d_i and e_i the ϕ -*division polynomials*.
(= Cantor's ℓ -division polys for $\phi = [\ell]$)

We say that ϕ is *efficiently computable* if the ϕ -division polynomials have low degree.
(ie, if evaluating ϕ is in $O(1)$ field ops)

Note: $[\ell]$ -division polys have degree in $O(\ell^2)$

Genus 2, faster

Gaudry, Kohel,
Smith

Genus 1 and 2

Point counting

Division polys

Kernels

Schoof complexity

BSGS

Real multiplication

Split primes

Smaller kernels

New relations

RM Complexity

$1 = 2$

RM families

Implementation

Cryptographic
Jacobians

Too much, too fast

Computing generic elements of $\ker \phi \subset J_C$

Let ϕ be an explicit endomorphism,
 $(u_1, v_1), (u_2, v_2)$ generic points on C ,
 D_1, D_2 their images in J_C .

$D = (x^2 + a_1x + a_0, y - (b_1x + b_0)) := D_1 + D_2$
is a generic point of J_C .

1. Compute $\phi(D_1)$ and $\phi(D_2)$;
2. Solve for (u_1, v_1, u_2, v_2) in $\phi(D_1) = -\phi(D_2)$;
3. Resymmetrizing, compute a triangular ideal I_ϕ
of relations in a_1, a_0, b_1, b_0 satisfied when $D \in \ker \phi$.

Suppose degree of ϕ -division polynomials bounded by δ :

- ▶ compute I_ϕ in $\tilde{O}(\delta^3)$ \mathbb{F}_q -operations;
- ▶ the degree of I_ϕ is in $O(\delta^2)$

Conventional Schoof–Pila complexity:

- ▶ For each prime ℓ :
 1. Compute I_ℓ in $\tilde{O}(\ell^6)$ field ops
 - ▶ $[\ell]$ -division polynomials have degree in $O(\ell^2)$
 - ▶ triangular I_ℓ has degree in $O(\ell^4)$
 2. compute $\pi^2(D)$, $(\pi^2 + [\bar{q}])\pi(D)$, and $(\pi^2 + [\bar{q}])^2(D)$ in $\tilde{O}(\ell^4 \log q)$ field ops
 3. Find the (\bar{s}_1, \bar{s}_2) in $(\mathbb{Z}/\ell\mathbb{Z})^2$ such that $(\pi^2 + [\bar{q}])^2(D) - [\bar{s}_1](\pi^2 + [\bar{q}])\pi(D) + [\bar{s}_2]\pi^2(D) = 0$
... $O(\ell)$ trials, each costing $\tilde{O}(\ell^4)$ field ops
 \implies total cost $\tilde{O}(\ell^5)$ field ops
 \implies Computing χ_ℓ costs $\tilde{O}(\ell^4(\ell^2 + \log q))$ field ops
- ▶ We need χ_ℓ for the $O(\log q)$ primes ℓ in $O(\log q)$
- ▶ $\implies \chi$ costs $\tilde{O}(\log^7)$ field ops = $\tilde{O}(\log^8 q)$ **bit ops**

Genus 2, faster

Gaudry, Kohel,
Smith

Genus 1 and 2

Point counting

Division polys

Kernels

Schoof complexity

BSGS

Real multiplication

Split primes

Smaller kernels

New relations

RM Complexity

1 = 2

RM families

Implementation

Cryptographic
Jacobians

Too much, too fast

Computing in $J_C[\ell]$ becomes awkward very quickly in genus 2; we're limited to $\ell = O(\text{a handful of bits})$.

This gives us s_1 and s_2 modulo some integer M .

We finish the computation using a generic algorithm such as BSGS, which runs in time

- ▶ $\tilde{O}(q^{3/4}/M)$ when $M < 8\sqrt{q}$, and
- ▶ $\tilde{O}(\sqrt{q}/M)$ when $M \geq 8\sqrt{q}$.

This all sounds pretty bad.

Why would we want to use genus 2 again, anyway?

Remember:

Genus 2 is not just a two-dimensional analogue of genus 1
(it's much more fun than that).

Recall:

- ▶ $\text{End}(J_C) \otimes \mathbb{Q} = \mathbb{Q}(\pi)$ is a quartic CM-field.
- ▶ Complex conjugation = Rosati involution $\alpha \mapsto \alpha^\dagger$
- ▶ Real quadratic subfield: $\mathbb{Q}(\pi + \pi^\dagger) \cong \mathbb{Q}(\sqrt{\Delta})$
for some $\Delta > 0$.
- ▶ We say C has RM by \mathcal{O} if \mathcal{O} is a real quadratic order
isomorphic to a subring of $\text{End}(J_C)$
- ▶ isomorphism classes with RM by a fixed \mathcal{O} form
Humbert surfaces in the 3-dimensional moduli space.

Genus 2, faster

Gaudry, Kohel,
Smith

Genus 1 and 2

Point counting

Division polys

Kernels

Schoof complexity

BSGS

Real multiplication

Split primes

Smaller kernels

New relations

RM Complexity

1 = 2

RM families

Implementation

Cryptographic
Jacobians

Too much, too fast

Elliptic Curves with Schoof–Elkies–Atkin

- ▶ $\mathbb{Z}[\pi]$ is an unknown quadratic extension of \mathbb{Z} .
- ▶ Some primes ℓ split in $\mathbb{Z}[\pi]$.
- ▶ $(\ell) = (\alpha)(\bar{\alpha}) \implies E[\ell] = E[\alpha] \oplus E[\bar{\alpha}]$
- ▶ For these primes, compute modulo $\deg(\ell - 1)/2$ factors of division polynomials (of $\deg(\ell^2 - 1)/2$).
- ▶ Heuristically (assuming enough split primes), reduces complexity from $\tilde{O}(\log^5 q)$ to $\tilde{O}(\log^4 q)$ bit ops.
- ▶ **Problem:** we don't know which ℓ split in advance; testing and splitting a given ℓ is complicated...
 - ▶ Need to build & factor modular polynomials
 - ▶ Extension to genus 2 is problematic

Our idea:

- ▶ $\mathbb{Z} \subset \mathbb{Z}[\phi] \subset \mathbb{Z}[\pi, \pi^\dagger]$; but $\mathbb{Z} \subset \mathbb{Z}[\phi]$ is explicit, so we can split primes ℓ in $\mathbb{Z}[\phi]$ instead of $\mathbb{Z}[\pi, \pi^\dagger]$
- ▶ Split $(\ell) = (\alpha_1)(\alpha_2) \implies J_{\mathcal{C}}[\ell] = J_{\mathcal{C}}[\alpha_1] \oplus J_{\mathcal{C}}[\alpha_2]$.
Efficient $\phi \implies$ explicit $J_{\mathcal{C}}[\alpha_1]$ and $J_{\mathcal{C}}[\alpha_2]$.
- ▶ Compute in $J_{\mathcal{C}}[\alpha_1]$ and $J_{\mathcal{C}}[\alpha_2]$ faster than in $J_{\mathcal{C}}[\ell]$.
- ▶ Hence, compute χ_ℓ faster for split ℓ .
- ▶ The split ℓ are known in advance: $(\Delta/\ell) = 1$; Chebotarev density \implies half the primes ℓ split in $\mathbb{Z}[\phi]$.
- ▶ Also, explicit $\mathbb{Z}[\phi] \implies$ a better search space (so we need fewer χ_ℓ to determine χ).
- ▶ \longrightarrow a *much* better complexity for computing χ .

The details:

Suppose ℓ splits in $\mathbb{Z}[\phi]$.

For our families, the primes over ℓ are principal:

$$(\ell) = (\alpha_1)(\alpha_2) \quad \text{and} \quad J_{\mathcal{C}}[\ell] = J_{\mathcal{C}}[\alpha_1] \oplus J_{\mathcal{C}}[\alpha_2].$$

- ▶ We can compute generators $\alpha_i = a_i + b_i\phi$ with a_i, b_i in $O(\sqrt{\ell})$
- ▶ The $[a_i]$ - and $[b_i]$ -division polys have degree in $O(\ell)$
- ▶ \implies the α_i -division polys have degree in $O(\ell)$
- ▶ \implies kernel ideals I_{α_i} have degrees in $O(\ell^2)$
(& we can compute I_{α_i} in $\tilde{O}(\ell^3)$ field operations).

Suppose $\mathbb{Z}[\pi + \pi^\dagger] \subset \mathbb{Z}[\phi]$, so

$$\pi + \pi^\dagger = m + n\phi$$

for some m and n in $O(\sqrt{q})$. These determine s_1 and s_2 :

$$s_1 = \text{Tr}(\pi + \pi^\dagger) = 2m + n\text{Tr}(\phi)$$

$$s_2 = \text{N}(\pi + \pi^\dagger) = \frac{1}{4}(s_1^2 - n^2 \text{disc}(\mathbb{Z}[\phi])).$$

- ▶ $(\pi^2 + [\bar{q}])(D) = [y_i]\pi(D)$ for D in $J_C[a_i + b_i\phi]$,
where $y_i = (m - na_i/b_i) \bmod \ell$.
- ▶ So we find \bar{s}_1 and \bar{s}_2 by finding y_1 and y_2 :
ie $2 \times$ one-dimensional DLP in $(\mathbb{Z}/\ell\mathbb{Z})$
(and with fewer costly Frobenius applications).

RM Schoof–Pila complexity

- ▶ For each *split* prime $(\ell) = (\alpha_1)(\alpha_2)$
 1. Compute $I_{\alpha_1}, I_{\alpha_2}$ (deg $O(\ell^2)$) in $\tilde{O}(\ell^3)$ field ops
 2. Compute $(\pi^2 + [\bar{q}])(D_i), \pi(D_i)$
in $\tilde{O}(\ell^2 \log q)$ field ops
 3. Recover \bar{m}, \bar{n} from \bar{y}_1, \bar{y}_2 in $\mathbb{Z}/\ell\mathbb{Z}$
such that $(\pi^2 + [\bar{q}])(D_i) = [y_1]\pi(D_i)$
... $O(\sqrt{\ell})$ trials, each costing $\tilde{O}(\ell^2)$ field ops
 \implies total cost $\tilde{O}(\ell^{3/2})$ field ops

\implies Computing χ_ℓ costs $\tilde{O}(\ell^2(\ell + \log q))$ field ops
(vs conventional $\tilde{O}(\ell^4(\ell^2 + \log q))$ field ops)
- ▶ We need χ_ℓ for the $O(\log q)$ split primes in $O(\log q)$
- ▶ $\implies \chi$ in $\tilde{O}(\log^4 q)$ field ops = $\tilde{O}(\log^5 q)$ **bit ops**
(vs conventional $\tilde{O}(\log^8 q)$ bit ops)

Check it out:

- ▶ Schoof for Elliptic Curves / \mathbb{F}_q :
proven $\tilde{O}(\log^5 q)$ bit ops
- ▶ Schoof–Elkies–Atkin for Elliptic Curves / \mathbb{F}_q :
heuristic $\tilde{O}(\log^4 q)$ bit ops
- ▶ RM Schoof–Pila for genus 2 / \mathbb{F}_q :
proven $\tilde{O}(\log^5 q)$ bit ops

So point counting has the same unconditional complexity
for genus 2 explicit-RM curves over \mathbb{F}_q
and elliptic curves *over the same* \mathbb{F}_q !

We can construct genus 2 curves with efficient RM using some explicit one/two-parameter families.
(Mestre, Tautz–Top–Verberkmoes, Hashimoto, Brumer...)

Consider the Tautz–Top–Verberkmoes family

$$\mathcal{C} : y^2 = x^5 - 5x^3 + 5x + t.$$

We have an explicit endomorphism ϕ defined by

$$\phi((u, v)) = (x^2 - \tau ux + u^2 + \tau^2 - 4, y - v)$$

where $\tau = \zeta_5 + \zeta_5^{-1}$ (in \mathbb{F}_q if $q \not\equiv \pm 2 \pmod{5}$).

We have $\phi^2 + \phi - 1 = 0$, so
 \mathcal{C} has efficient RM by $\mathbb{Z}[\phi] \cong \mathbb{Z}[\frac{1+\sqrt{5}}{2}]$.

Genus 2, faster

Gaudry, Kohel,
Smith

Genus 1 and 2

Point counting

Division polys

Kernels

Schoof complexity

BSGS

Real multiplication

Split primes

Smaller kernels

New relations

RM Complexity

1 = 2

RM families

Implementation

Cryptographic
Jacobians

Too much, too fast

A proof-of-concept implementation

Algorithm implemented in C++/NTL
(with Magma for non-critical steps).

- ▶ We did *not* use any small prime powers
- ▶ We did *not* use BSGS, just accelerated Schoof–Pila

Cryptographic Jacobians: 256 bits

We searched for a secure genus 2 curve in the family

$$\mathcal{C} : y^2 = x^5 - 5x^3 + 5x + t$$

over \mathbb{F}_q with $q = 2^{128} + 573$.

Computing $\chi(T)$ for a given specialization takes
about 3 Core2 core-hours at 2.83GHz;
we use the split primes $\ell \leq 131$.

We ran 245 trials, finding 27 prime-order Jacobians.

We found that the Jacobian of the curve at
 $t = 75146620714142230387068843744286456025$
has prime order, and so does its quadratic twist.

Genus 2, faster

Gaudry, Kohel,
Smith

Genus 1 and 2

Point counting

Division polys

Kernels

Schoof complexity

BSGS

Real multiplication

Split primes

Smaller kernels

New relations

RM Complexity

1 = 2

RM families

Implementation

Cryptographic
Jacobians

Too much, too fast

But 256 bits is so two years ago...

...so we computed the order of a kilobit Jacobian (!)

We computed $\chi(T)$ for $C : y^2 = x^5 - 5x^3 + 5x + t$
over \mathbb{F}_q with $q = 2^{512} + 1273$ and

$t = 29085666333787272437998261129919801749774533$
 $00368095776223256986807375270272014471477919$
 $88284560426970082027081672153243497592108531$
 $6560590832659122351278.$

The computation took about 80 core-days
(same setup as before);
we use the split primes $\ell \leq 419$.

Genus 2, faster

Gaudry, Kohel,
Smith

Genus 1 and 2

Point counting

Division polys

Kernels

Schoof complexity

BSGS

Real multiplication

Split primes

Smaller kernels

New relations

RM Complexity

$1 = 2$

RM families

Implementation

Cryptographic
Jacobians

Too much, too fast

The cardinality is

$$N = 17976931348623159077293051907890247336179$$
$$76978942306572734300811577326758055023757$$
$$37059489561441845417204171807809294449627$$
$$63452801227364805323818926258902074851818$$
$$08988886875773723732892032531588464639346$$
$$29657544938945248034686681123456817063106$$
$$48544084486938739666585942218663644225871$$
$$2684177900105119005520.$$

Genus 2, faster

Gaudry, Kohel,
Smith

Genus 1 and 2

Point counting

Division polys

Kernels

Schoof complexity

BSGS

Real multiplication

Split primes

Smaller kernels

New relations

RM Complexity

$1 = 2$

RM families

Implementation

Cryptographic
Jacobians

Too much, too fast